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OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION

18 April 1957

POSSIBLE BRIEFING APPROACH

I. Introductory Statement

- A. Historical statement of CIA participation.
- B. Summary of over-all availabilities and limitations of US and Soviet open-source materials.
- C. Contrast of differences in US and Soviet limitations of open-source materials.
- D. Extent to which each uses open-source materials on the other.
 - 1. Value to US primarily for intelligence purposes -- since Soviet science and technology generally not in advance of US -- except in few cases. (Give examples)
 - 2. Value to Soviet primarily to assist their technical development.
 - a. Evidence of widespread Soviet use of US technical materials.
 - b. Soviet intelligence needs on US industrial development -- in general -- generally met by unconcealable open-sources.
 - c. Soviet intelligence needs for strategic and military purposes more dependent on disclosures and "leaks" of classified information and on covert approaches, than on unclassified industrial materials possible of concealment.

II. Detailed Presentation

- A. Area by area (i.e., industrial economics, geographic, and scientific) statement of principal Soviet technical weaknesses likely to be benefited by US open-source materials.

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1. General statement -- including extent to which generally capable of denial.
 2. Key examples -- particularly where at least partial denial might be possible.
 3. Additional Soviet intelligence benefits from US open-source material -- with key examples.
- B. Detailed statement of US needs for Soviet open-source material for intelligence purposes.
1. General statement as to use by US intelligence and possible means of increasing access.
 2. Key examples of particular needs and suggestions for meeting.
 3. Additional US technical needs for Soviet published materials and suggestions for obtaining.
- C. Gains and costs.
1. In attempting greater denial of open-source materials.
 2. In attempting to maximize US access to Soviet open-source materials.
- III. Recapitulation -- brief summary statement of what is probably accomplishable -- if desired -- and of most appropriate means, and probable costs.

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